The deal [between Pakistan and Libya’s LNA] represents normalization of Libya’s fragmented sovereignty, the erosion of international enforcement mechanisms and the rise of a multipolar security marketplace.
Libya’s long, unresolved conflict has produced no shortage of foreign interventions, but few developments are as quietly consequential as the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) recent $4 billion arms agreement with Pakistan.
Finalized in Benghazi after a meeting between LNA deputy commander-in-chief Saddam Khalifa Haftar and Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, the deal marks more than a procurement milestone. It signals a shift in how power, legitimacy and alliances are being recalibrated in a country that has lived under fragmentation for over a decade.
At its core, the agreement is substantial. Sixteen JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter jets, jointly developed by Pakistan and China, will give the LNA a modern air combat capability it has never previously possessed.
The inclusion of twelve Super Mushak trainer aircraft points to something even more telling. It signals an intention to build sustained airpower rather than merely acquire prestige hardware. Combined with additional land, sea and air systems, as well as joint training and military manufacturing initiatives, the package suggests institutional ambition, not just battlefield necessity.
For Khalifa Haftar’s eastern-based forces, this is about consolidation. Since emerging as the dominant military actor in eastern Libya, the LNA has sought to portray itself as a national army-in-waiting, capable of imposing order on a country fractured by militias, rival governments and contested oil wealth. Modern air assets dramatically enhance that narrative. Air superiority, even limited, confers not just tactical advantage but political leverage, both domestically and in negotiations with rival factions in the west.
The timing matters. Libya remains formally bound by a United Nations arms embargo imposed in 2011 after the NATO-backed overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, renewed in November 2025. The embargo has, however, become something of a legal fiction. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres bluntly acknowledged in 2025 what Libyans and diplomats alike have long known, that the enforcement has been ineffective. Multiple states now supply weapons to Libyan actors with increasing openness.
Against that backdrop, Pakistan’s insistence that the deal does not violate international sanctions is less a bold legal claim than a reflection of reality. Haftar himself is not under UN sanctions and the international community has largely tolerated, if not officially endorsed, the steady militarization of Libya’s factions.
What makes Pakistan’s role notable is not that it is supplying arms, but that it is stepping into a space historically dominated by Russia and, in few aspects, western powers and a handful of regional players.
The JF-17, co-developed with China, is emblematic of an alternative defense ecosystem, as it is cheaper, politically flexible and untethered to Western conditionality. For the LNA, this diversification reduces dependence on any single patron.
For Pakistan, it represents both an economic opportunity and a strategic entry into North Africa, a region increasingly seen as pivotal to energy security, migration routes, and geopolitical competition.
Critics will argue, rightly, that such deals risk deepening Libya’s militarization at the expense of political reconciliation. Advanced fighter jets are not tools of compromise. They can harden positions, embolden maximalist aims and raise the stakes of any future confrontation. If rival factions respond by seeking their own upgrades, Libya could drift further from the already elusive goal of a unified national army under civilian control.
There is another, less discussed possibility. The power imbalances, however uncomfortable, can force political outcomes where stalemates persist. The LNA’s enhanced capabilities may strengthen Haftar’s hand in negotiations, compelling rivals to engage seriously rather than indefinitely postpone settlement behind fragile ceasefires. History offers examples where military dominance precedes political consolidation, though it also offers plenty of cautionary tales.
Beyond Libya, the deal underscores a broader regional trend. Middle Eastern and North African powers are increasingly pragmatic, sourcing security partnerships wherever interests align rather than adhering to traditional blocs. The influence of big powers, while still significant, is no longer assumed. Countries like Pakistan are finding space to operate in regions once considered peripheral to their strategic horizons.
The Pakistan-LNA agreement is less about jets and more about what it represents. The deal represents normalization of Libya’s fragmented sovereignty, the erosion of international enforcement mechanisms, and the rise of a multipolar security marketplace.
Whether this development brings Libya closer to stability or pushes it deeper into competitive militarization will depend not on the aircraft themselves, but on how power gained through force is translated, if at all, into political compromise.
For now, the message is clear. Libya’s war may be frozen, but its arms race is just beginning.
Sultan Nasser Al-Hamad is an independent analyst, and former journalist at daily newspaper Assafir.
OpEd Column Syndication 