There is a pressing need to break free from the “Purana-Pakistan” (old Pakistan) mindset, which, like Middle Eastern autocratic regimes, limits progress and resists change.
The downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria has sent shockwaves across the Middle East, underscoring the collapse of an authoritarian era. What started with the Arab Spring transformed into a destructive civil war that has lasted for thirteen years, bringing devastating consequences not only for Syria’s political and social fabric but also for the entire region.
Many in Pakistan view the Syrian crisis as a geopolitical chessboard for the world’s major powers, while few interpret it through the lens of sectarianism. Although both factors contributed to the crisis, the primary causes were the demands for fundamental changes and stability in Syria’s social, economic and political fabrics. When Assad’s government misjudged the protesters’ legitimate demands to be random and tried to handle the protests in the same way it did with other random protests, this delusion ultimately escalated the protesters’ grievances.
Today, Pakistan is brewing a similar storm, with rising inflation, unemployment, a lack of political representation and calls for fundamental change. The parallels between Pakistan’s current trajectory and Syria’s decline are striking. The increase in public protests and discontent over governance in Pakistan are reminiscent of the alarms that rang during the declines of Syria and Libya. The question now is whether Pakistan is on the verge of a similar crisis, or whether there is still time and room to pivot towards stability.
DIRECT REPERCUSSIONS OF SYRIAN COLLAPSE ON PAKISTAN
For the evolving situation in Syria, Pakistan has adopted a ‘wait and see’ policy with neutrality; however, the country is positioned on the geopolitical periphery of this chaos and is facing direct consequences from these events.
The Arab Spring in the Middle East was a wake-up call for authoritarian regimes to implement inclusive and open policies. While nations like Tunisia and Saudi Arabia embraced reforms, the governments of Syria, Libya and Sudan tried to control the turbulence with an iron fist. The Arab Spring set off a chain of civil wars over the past thirteen years, leading to the displacement of millions, refugee migration, massive infrastructure damage and the crippling of core economic sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture.
Is there a similarity here with Pakistan?
In 2022, U.S.-driven interest in combating inflation in Pakistan placed immense pressure on the country’s external debt servicing. In addition to currency depreciation, Pakistan faces energy crisis, rising public debt, underemployment and unemployment—issues that are not only damaging the economic fabric but also exacerbating political and social instability. By failing to enact comprehensive economic reforms, Pakistan is mirroring Syria’s plight.
In Syria, Kurdish forces’ and ISIS’s presence, ongoing conflicts in Lebanon, Israeli intervention along the Golan Heights, and the involvement of Turkey, the U.S. and Russia—all contributed to the country’s fragmentation. There are immense efforts and active separatist movements to establish Kurdistan, an independent country for the Kurds. Furthermore, the vacuum created by Assad’s fall allowed extremist groups to flourish, intensifying the threat of terrorism and extremism.
In Pakistan, terrorism could be further exacerbated by similar factors, such as porous borders and ongoing conflicts with Afghanistan, which serve as conduits for radical elements. Groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other factions aligned with international militant networks pose a growing threat to regional stability through recruitment, training and attacks.
PAKISTAN IN THE BACKDROP OF GREAT POWER CONFLICTS
When countries face internal instability or when governments fail to meet the basic demands of their citizens, external powers often see such situations as opportunities for intervention, which can trigger civil unrest. Indeed, weak institutions and public discontent create governance vacuums, inviting intervention by external actors. In the same way, geopolitical shifts within Syria increased regional rivalries, attracting multiple global and regional powers as well as non-state actors vying for influence. These circumstances complicated Syria’s stability.
In case of Pakistan, there are chances of increased interference from external powers influencing the country’s domestic and foreign policies. The U.S. and Western countries might impose strict conditions on financial loans and aid. They might also provide military support to different factions with the pretext to combat terrorism as seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Western countries might, with support from Afghanistan and India, strategically exploit Pakistan into further isolation through diplomatic and economic means.
Furthermore, in the potential circumstances where hostile powers choke Chinese trade in South China Sea, Pakistan would be the only route for China for trading and energy imports. Accordingly, China has already invested in various infrastructure projects across Pakistan, including the Gwadar seaport and airport, mostly under the framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As a result, China views, and perhaps rightly so, that the stability in Pakistan is important for China’s interests.
However, from a contrasting perspective, even instability in Pakistan could present an opportunity for China. This is because, using Pakistan’s instability as a pretext, China could deploy additional security personnel for safeguarding trade routes and Chinese investments in Pakistan. Should China take this step, it would have a significant impact on the region’s balance of influence. Hence, if China steps forward as a stabilizing force to guard Pakistan’s territorial and political unity against any future attempt of fragmentation, it would weaken the U.S. and Western influence in Pakistan, thereby altering the balance of geopolitical power not only in South Asia but also in the broader Indian Ocean region.
Such a civil war-like situation in Pakistan could also provide leverage for Russia, both economically and geopolitically. Russia’s long-standing desire to access the warm waters of the Indian Ocean could be realized by establishing influence over Pakistan’s southern coastline through the Gwadar port. This would provide Russia strong foothold in Indian Ocean region including South Asia. Additionally, it would give Russia an opportunity to create pressure points or strike deals for strategic gains using its influence in Afghanistan and Iran.
Keeping all these in mind, Russia, under its current President Vladimir Putin, may not hesitate to mirror its Syria strategy for Pakistan. Similar to Syria, Russia may not shy away from supporting factions in Pakistan with advisory assistance, military support and diplomatic cover.
In the event of any such future instability in Pakistan, the Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, might push for closer alignment with various conflicting factions to gain economic, strategic, ideological and military advantages. Their economic interests could involve real estate and energy ports, while ideological influence could be exerted through the Shia-Sunni divide and a strengthened Wahhabi presence. The interests of great powers would likely clash in a manner similar to Syria, where multiple competing factors for influence were involved.
In the aftermath of Syria’s civil war, social and cultural fragmentations have been soaring. Such a change in Syria could pose a significant threat to social cohesion in Pakistan, which already faces ethnic, linguistic and religious divisions as well as economic inequality, lack of political representation and issues of provincial autonomy. The ongoing unrest in Azad Kashmir1 and Gilgit-Baltistan (Pakistan-administered-Kashmir), the ousting of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the Shia-Sunni conflict, and ethnic tensions between Punjabis and Pashtuns are just a few examples. Any intensification of these existing fault-lines could polarize Pakistani society, destabilizing the nation and undermining national unity.
IMRAN KHAN AGAINST WHOM? ARMY OR POLITICAL PARTIES?
The public sentiment is towards fundamental and genuine representation and reforms. The pressing need is to break the Purana-Pakistan (old-Pakistan) mindset, a stance akin to the Middle Eastern autocratic regimes that limits progress and resists change.
Pakistan’s political landscape is deeply polarized, with governance challenges involving the political elite. It is widely perceived that the ongoing political unrest is Imran Khan’s conflict with either the major political parties or the Pakistan Army. However, the reality is far more complex. The issue is rooted in the legitimate public demand for fundamental changes and cleaner reforms within a 75-year-old rotten governance system. The protests are not directed against the institutions themselves but against the inherent flaws in the system, such as the theft of public mandates by rigging elections and the prejudicial control over the media and judiciary.
The public sentiment is for fundamental and genuine representation and reforms. There is a pressing need to break free from the “Purana-Pakistan” (old Pakistan) mindset, which, like Middle Eastern autocratic regimes, limits progress and resists change.
Khizra Anwaar is a researcher and analyst and writes about various topics including, but not limited to, Pakistan’s internal politics and foreign affairs. Khizra currently serves as a Research Assistant at Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University and as a Policy Officer at the All Pakistan Women’s Association in Multan. She holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Sargodha and has studied human rights from Universiteit Leiden and the University of London.
- Although the author used the term “Azad Kashmir”, the Oped Column Syndication terms the area as “Pakistan-administered-Kashmir”, similar to our terminology of “India-administered-Kashmir”, so as to maintain our editorial neutrality on Kashmir issue. ↩︎
OpEd Column Syndication 