Much like chemical weapons and landmines before them, drones must be subject to arms control conversations, export limitations and ethical usage guidelines.
When the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict broke out in May, it wasn’t the thunder of tanks or the roar of fighter jets that first signaled the escalation—it was the low hum of drones. In this conflict, drones have not just complemented military power; they have defined it. The extent and sophistication of unmanned aerial warfare in this conflict marks a disturbing, decisive shift in how regional wars are fought—and possibly how global powers will recalibrate their strategic thinking.
The conflict has seen an unprecedented scale of drone deployment. India’s use of Israeli-origin Harop loitering munitions and its growing focus on swarm drone tactics has enabled precision strikes deep within Pakistani territory. In retaliation, Pakistan has leaned on a mix of Chinese CH-4 drones, Turkish Bayraktar Akincis, and its own Burraq UAVs to target Indian military assets and urban centers. According to Western observers, over 500 drones were intercepted or engaged over Indian territory in just a matter of days. In Pakistan, cities like Karachi and Lahore faced direct hits from loitering drones, highlighting a grim new front where no civilian population center is off limits.
This new chapter in South Asian military history reflects not just the growing reliance on drone technology but also the implications of its rapid proliferation. These are no longer niche tools reserved for asymmetric warfare or counter-terrorism; they are now central to full-scale inter-state conflict.
There are three key dangers in this evolution, each of which deserves serious international scrutiny.
First is the erosion of deterrence. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed, and their previous large-scale conflicts were restrained by the shadow of mutual destruction. But drones, especially loitering munitions and armed UAVs, create a new grey zone. They allow for “plausibly deniable” strikes and rapid escalation that can circumvent traditional command-and-control oversight. When a drone can be launched autonomously and strike a target hundreds of kilometers away with limited attribution, the room for miscalculation expands exponentially.
Second, drone warfare collapses the timeline of response. Decision-makers no longer have hours or even minutes to respond to an incursion. Drones can be launched, rerouted, and strike within a matter of seconds. This compacts the diplomatic breathing room that has previously been critical to defusing tensions in crises like the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot episode. The absence of warning means that retaliation could be just as immediate—heightening the risk of escalation beyond either side’s intent.
Third, the democratization of drone technology opens the door to proxy actors. In regions like Kashmir, where non-state actors are already active, the accessibility of commercially available drones could blur lines between state and insurgent operations. A future in which a terrorist group could fly a weaponized drone into a heavily militarized zone is not just plausible—it’s probable. That possibility raises alarms not just for India and Pakistan but for every government battling sub-state extremism.
The strategic consequences extend beyond South Asia. China, Israel, Turkey, and the United States—all major drone exporters—are watching this conflict closely. The 2025 war is, in many ways, a global showroom for the next generation of air power. The success or failure of drone swarms, loitering munitions, and hybrid manned-unmanned operations will shape procurement and military doctrine worldwide.
And yet, international institutions are lagging dangerously behind. There is no binding multilateral framework regulating the use of military drones, and no Geneva Convention clause that fully addresses their ethical, legal, or strategic ramifications. The United Nations Security Council, as expected, failed to pass a resolution condemning the drone attacks, paralyzed by geopolitical divisions among permanent members. Meanwhile, civilians in Amritsar, Srinagar, Rawalpindi, and Lahore have paid the price.
What is urgently needed is a global dialogue on the rules of drone warfare. Much like chemical weapons and landmines before them, drones must be subject to arms control conversations, export limitations, and ethical usage guidelines. The U.S., EU, and major Asian powers must lead in developing these norms—before technology races ahead of diplomacy.
The 2025 India-Pakistan drone war is a wake-up call. The hum of drones over South Asia may fade as this crisis de-escalates, but their legacy will echo in war rooms and policy debates around the globe. We cannot afford to ignore the fact that the next major war—whether in Taiwan, the Middle East, or Eastern Europe—may be won or lost by machines flying without pilots, governed by decisions made in microseconds, and escalated before human diplomacy even catches up.
Let’s hope this is the last time drones are allowed to write the first—and last—lines of a war story.
Bahauddin Foizee is an analyst & columnist focusing on the assessment of threat/risk associated with business, economy and investment as well as legal, security, political and geopolitical threat/risk. His articles on these areas as well as on social, environmental, financial and military affairs in the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific and Middle East regions have been widely published.
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